We examine the mapping of the distribution of ability onto earnings in a job assignment model. Workers are assigned to a continuum of jobs in fixed proportions, ordered by sensitivity to ability. The model implies a novel marginal productivity interpretation of wages. We derive comparative statics for changes in technology and in the distribution of ability. We find conditions under which a more unequal distribution of ability * We appreciate the helpful comments of seminar participants at the University of Chicago, Harvard University, Northwestern University, the University of Pennsylvania, Washington University, Boston University, the University of Massachusetts, Suffolk University and the NBER Income Distribution Group 1 maps onto a more/less unequal distribution of earnings. We also analyze an assignment model with variable proportions and find that in the Cobb-Douglas case, a rise in ability inequality always narrows the range of earnings.
Introduction
How does the distribution of ability or skill map onto the distribution of earnings? A variety of public policy questions concern the comparative statics of this mapping. Examples of policies that alter the skill mix are :(a) immigration policy; (b) worker training policy; (c) educational policies, such as ability grouping or tracking; (d) labor market integration of groups, regions, or countries with different skill distributions; and (e) policies which affect employer information regarding employee skills, such as testing. In each of these cases, a matter of policy concern is the incidence of gains and losses across the income distribution, i.e. the comparative statics of the mapping from the distribution of ability to that of earnings. In addition, quite aside from specific policy questions, the mapping bears on the important historical question of how the rise in earnings inequality since the 1970s can be traced to changes in the distribution of ability (supply) and to changes in technology (the demand for skills). Finally, the mapping addresses the fundamental question of whether a rise in inequality of ability necessarily leads to greater earnings inequality, and, more importantly, the conditions under which it does or does not.
In this paper, we develop the theory of this mapping in a job assignment model. The reason we do so is that assignment models place structure on the production technology in a way that provides an informative interpretation. To fix ideas, consider for the moment a standard production function of different discrete grades of labor, F (L 1 , ..., L n ) . The mapping from the distribution of ability to earnings is then fully described by the MP functions, w i = F i (L 1 , ..., L n ) , i = 1, ..., n, and the comparative statics of the mapping rest on second partials, F ij (L 1 , ..., L n ) . However, to say something substantive about the wage effects of shifts in the ability distribution -something that goes behind the cross partials -requires some informative structure on the production technology, and that is what assignment models provide.
Specifically, suppose production takes place in teams of workers, assigned to varying tasks (or jobs), based on their ability, and that output depends on the quantity or quality of the various tasks performed. What gives an assignment model its analytical force is the fact that the assignment of workers to tasks is endogenous. In models of the type considered in this paper, workers of type i cannot simply be added to any given task without some reshuffling of other personnel among other jobs. In the simplest example, there may be some fixed relationship between the number of production and non-production workers: one cannot increase on without the other. More generally, if there is a hierarchy of jobs, the addition of low-skill workers toward the bottom of the hierarchy will allow other workers to move up the job ladder. Hence, F (L 1 , ..., L n ) must be understood as a reduced form production function, and the partials and cross-partials must be interpreted correspondingly, including the effect of reassignments.
The mapping of ability to earnings depends on the following features of the underlying technology we have just described:
First, it depends on the gradient across tasks of how sensitive performance is to ability. Whether that gradient -and, hence, the sensitivity of output to proper job assignment -is concentrated in the high-skill or low-skill jobs will be important. For example, we will show that if this gradient in skill-sensitivity is concentrated among high-skill jobs, then a rise in inequality of ability will tend to reduce inequality of earnings. To sketch the argument, note that the value of an additional low-ability worker is enhanced by the productivity gains of those workers who can now be promoted to more ability-sensitive jobs. Conversely, the value of an additional high-ability worker is reduced by the productivity losses of those workers who must be demoted to make room for him at the top. If these gains and losses are concentrated in high-skill jobs, occupied by workers in the right tail of the distribution, then a rise in ability inequality (which raises those workers' ability) will magnify the effect of reassignment upon addition of a low-or high-ability worker. Hence, wages will rise at the bottom and fall at the top, reducing earnings inequality. This result involves in an essential way the reassignment of workers and could therefore not be understood outside of an assignment model.
A second feature of the technology is the degree of complementarity of workers in the team, across tasks. If the degree of complementarity is high, then two heads are no better than one on any given task, without the addition of a full complement of worker on other tasks. The nature of the mapping from ability to earnings depends on this complementarity, on how much better two heads (or pairs of hands) are than one. To analyze this, we advance the assignment literature a major step beyond the traditional assumption of fixed proportions between workers and tasks. Under variable proportions, firms face a non-trivial assignment problem of choosing the optimal density of workers across tasks. We find a simple but powerful relationship between the wage profile and the firstorder (Euler) condition for the optimal assignment. To continue the example above, this allows us to explore further the conditions under which a rise in ability inequality reduces earnings inequality. We find that if the degree of complementarity of workers across tasks is reduced from that of fixed proportions to that of Cobb-Douglas, then a rise in ability inequality will always narrow the wage gap between top and bottom, a much stronger result than for fixed proportions. 1 The assignment literature, surveyed by Sattinger [1993] , distinguishes between models where assignment is based on workers' preferences over job characteristics (e.g. Tinbergen [1951] ) , comparative advantage (e.g. Roy [1951] , Sattinger [1975] , Heckman and Guilherme [1985] , Teulings [1995] ), and production complementarities across jobs. (e.g. Sattinger [1979] , Sattinger [1980] ). This third type of assignment model, less familiar than the others, is the basis for our paper. As outlined above, the model captures key features of a hierarchical production technology under which jobs can be ordered by sensitivity to ability, but all must be filled in more or less fixed proportions. Workers of the highest general ability are assigned to the most ability-sensitive jobs and those of least abiltiy are assigned to the least sensitive jobs. This is very different from a comparative advantage model, since the assignment does not rest on heterogeneous skills, ability is one-dimensional in the model's purest form. Conversely, in a comparative advantage model, there is typicaly no technological constraint on the proportions of workers across jobs: all workers could end up on the same job if there were no differences in workers' relative productivies across jobs. Comparative advantage models have proven quite fruitful for several decades, but there is some recent literature that suggests an erosion of the role of comparative advantage in explaining the distribution of income. This is the finding of Gould [2002] , who explains that the rising importance of general or cognitive skills is raising the correlation of skill valuation across broad occupational groups. If so, a model of the type developed here might be of increasing relevance. Sattinger's (1979 Sattinger's ( ,1980 model is the most direct precedent of our model. He considers a continuum of jobs where labor of varying quality works with complementary machines of varying size. Workers of higher ability are optimally assigned to jobs with more capital. Sattinger solves for the prices of labor and machine-rental of varying quality. The slopes of the wage and rental functions are derived from no-arbitrage conditions, and the levels are set by outside options for labor and capital. He uses this setup to explore the effect of capital heterogeneity on the distribution of labor earnings.
Our model in Sections 3,4 has some formal similarities with the Sattinger model because it also assumes fixed proportions between the continuums of workers and tasks, i.e. a fixed "production hierarchy." This implies that we have the same no-arbitrage condition for the slope of the wage function. But the 1 A third feature of the technology which matters to this mapping is the manner in which performed tasks are combined to generate output. It matters whether performed tasks are highly subsitutable (e.g. output is linear in performed tasks), or whether technology is more like O-rings (Kremer [1993] , where output is Cobb-Douglas in performed tasks). As Kremer and others have shown, if there is complementarity across tasks, which implies positive crosspartials in ability, at least some assortative matching by ability will obtain across firms. In this paper, we confine our attention to perfect substitutability across tasks, with no assortative matching, as discussed further in Note 4. level of the wage function is determined differently -by the zero-profit condition -because our model focuses on complementarities among types of labor in the same enterprise rather than capital-labor complementarities on jobs which are independent of one another.
Our analysis of this fixed proportions model offers several major advances. First, we show that wages are in fact marginal productivities of a reduced form production function (in continuous form), where an increment of labor of a given quality leads to reassignment of all other workers. 2 The effect of that reassignment on output depends critically on the gradient of ability-sensitivity across jobs, in a way that sheds light on comparative statics of the ability-wage mapping.
Second, we find the assignment model's analogue (in continuous-ability) of the production function's cross-partials, F ij (L 1 , ..., L n ) .This allow us to characterize Hicks substitutability or complementarity across ability types, and how that depends on the technology in a way that goes beyond merely stating signs of elasticities of substitution. This in turn helps us analyze who wins and who loses from changes in the skill mix, such as immigration drawn from a particular part of the ability distribution.
Third (as mentioned above), we ascertain the conditions under which an increase in ability inequality leads to an increase or decrease in the spread of wages. We show that this analysis directly applies to the issue of improved information about employees , since better information increases the inequality of expected ability. Our results may therefore be pertinent to recent discussions about whether or not testing and other forms of information generate an efficiency-equity trade-off, by improving the match of workers to jobs, while making it easier for firms to distinguish high-from low-ability workers. By providing a general equilibrium analysis of this question, we find conditions under which this trade-off does or does not exist. 3 Another change in the distribution of abilities arises from integrating workers from two distinct ability distributions. Two different groups, regions, or countries may differ either in their underlying distribution of ability, or in the 2 Sattinger states that marginal productivities are undefined in his model, due to fixed proportions between capital and labor on any given job. But this implicitly defines MP's as holding constant not only the quantity of other inputs, but also their assignment. 3 Rothschild and Stiglitz [1982] provide a model with a continuum of jobs, which posits a quadratic loss in productivity for any mismatch between the individual's ability and the skill requirement of the job. With normally distributed ability, they find that finer information generates higher mean earnings and higher variance, i.e an inefficiency -equity tradeoff. By contrast, Heckman and Honore [1990] show that in the Roy model, perfect assignemnt not only raises mean earnings, but reduces earnings inequality, compared to random sectoral assigment in the same proportions. This might be interpreted as comparing a perfect test and no test. MacDonald [1982] also analyzes the effect of imperfect substitutes in the production of output (as discussed in note 1 above). Although MacDonald does show that information raises output, he finds ambiguous effects on wage levels and does not examine the effect on wage inequality. precision of information available about the abilities of their members. We analyze what we believe to be a novel question: if one can estimate more accurately the ability of workers in country (group or region) A than in B, who gains, and how much, when the two countries (groups or regions) integrate into a single market?
In sum, we offer an extensive exploration of the comparative statics of the wage distribution with respect to the distribution of ability (and also technology), thereby extending the assignment literature based on fixed proportions between workers and jobs. We then go on, in Section 5, to relax the assumption of fixed proportions between workers and tasks, as described above. Finally, in Section 6, we briefly discuss some limitations of our assumptions, and conclude with some reflections on what light our analysis might shed on recent decades' trends in the distribution of income.
A Two-Job Model
In this work we investigate the relationship between the distribution of workers' abilities, and the resulting distribution of wages which obtains in competitive equilibrium. A worker's contribution to total firm output depends on his own ability, and also on the job which he occupies. We begin by finding the equilibrium distribution of wages in a simple two-job model.
The key feature of the model is that jobs must be filled in fixed proportions to one another, θ and (1 − θ) . Consider a world, for example, of production and supervisory jobs, with a fixed spand of control. Alternatively, suppose production takes place in teams of fixed composition, e.g. two-person teams of an electrician and an electrician's helper. One may think of software teams as coders and debuggers in proportions that are hard to vary, or research teams with lead researchers and research assistants, where, again, the quantity of workers cannot be substituted for quality in one or the other type of job.
In the simplest case, output depends only on the ability of those in production jobs; support jobs generate no output, but must be filled to keep the operation going. More generally, suppose one job is more ability-sensitive than the other, such that output per unit of ability on the two jobs is β 1 > β 0 > 0. Thus, θ, β 0 and β 1 completely characterize the technology.
Let µ ∈ [0, 1] denote a worker's ability (or expected ability, given available information). The distribution of ability is exogenous, and characterized by the CDF F (µ), so p = F (µ) denotes the ability fractile of a worker with ability µ. Equivalently, let µ (p) ≡ F −1 (p) denote the ability at rank p. Obviously workers will be assigned to job 1 or 0 as µ ≷μ ≡ µ (θ) . Output is
It is important to be clear on how the complementarities under consideration in this model (and in the continuous job version below) pertain to the number of workers across jobs vs. their abilities. Under the strict complementarity we have posited (which will be relaxed in Section 5), the effect on output of adding another worker of any given ability to a given job depends very much on the number of workers in the other jobs: they must remain in strict proportion. By contrast, the effect on output of raising the ability of a worker in one job is assumed independent of the abilities of workers in the other jobs. 4 The wage schedule is derived from two conditions. The no-arbitrage condition on job assignment gives the slope of the wage function:
Otherwise profits could be raised by substituting one type of worker for another. The no-profit condition, Q = R 1 0 W (µ) dF (µ) sets the level of the wage function. Specifically, these conditions imply
as depicted in Figure 1 .
These expressions have a straight-forward marginal productivity interpretation. An additional worker of ability µ <μ adds β 0 µ to output directly on job 0, but also allows the promotion of (1 − θ) workers to job 1. These workers will be promoted from the margin between the jobs, so they will be of abilitŷ µ ≡ µ (θ) .The output from each of these (1 − θ) workers will rise by (β 1 − β 0 )μ, so this indirect contribution to output is captured in the second term of (1). Thus, low-ability workers earn more than their contribution to output. Similarly, an additional worker of ability µ >μ, placed on job 1, earns less than his or her direct contribution to output, β 1 µ. That is because placement in job 1 4 The model implicitly assumes that performed tasks are perfect substitutes in generating output, as mentioned in Note 1 above: output is simply the sum of performed tasks. For industries adequately approximated by the two-job case with β 0 = 0, this assumption entails no further loss of generality -a different degree of task substitutability would have no effect. The assumption may also capture essential features in other cases, e.g. (to take perhaps only a slight caricature) academic departments where output is the (quality-adjusted) sum of articles produced, while some departmental jobs that leave less time for research (i.e. low-β jobs) must nonetheless be filled. For other industries, however, the degree of cross-task complementarity may be important, as in Kremer's O-ring analysis. This leads to assortative matching, which , the literature has shown, leads to greater inequality of earnings from any given distribution of ability. Our own analysis (available on request) finds that even if we abstract from assortative matching, the relaxation of perfect substitutability across tasks makes it more likely that a mean-preserving spread of ability widens the wage span.
requires the demotion of θ workers of abilityμ to job 0, with the attendant loss of output, as reflected in the second term of (2) .
Note that the technology is one of constant returns to scale: doubling inputs of all ability levels leavesμ and the wage schedules unchanged and doublees output. Thus, as implied by Euler's theorem in the standard production model, marginal productivity payments exhaust output and the zero profit condition obtains, as stated. There are no externailties at work here, despite the fact that workers receive more or less than the direct value of the tasks they perform. There is in principle, nothing different going on there than usual, since marginal productivities always depend on the interaction between marginal and incumbent workers of different abilities. This model merely specifies that intereaction in a particular way that distinguishes between the direct value of tasks performed by the marginal worker and the effect on the value of tasks performed by incumbent workers, by virtue of the optimal reassignment.
Perhaps further light can be shed on the market mechanism establishing equilibrium wages by considering the market for services provided by a labor contractor. The key thing to note in this model is that the contract is not simply for a certain level of services, but also depends on the number of workers supplying those services. This is clearest in the simple case, where workers in low-skill jobs make no direct contribution to output (β 0 = 0), but merely enable workers in high-skill jobs to produce output: more such workers are enabled, the more helpers ar provided. 5 More generally, the market value of a team of contracted workers has two terms (found by integraing over (1) and (2)): one is the value of the tasks they perform, and the other depends on the number of workers with high or low ability ( relative to the workers on the margin between jobs 0 and 1 in contracting firms). Thus, two teams providing services of the same direct value, will differ in their market value, depending on the size and ability of the teasm, due to the effect of the reassignments their hiring will occasion on the part of the contracting firms. In equilibrium, workers will be fully sorted by ability into jobs 0 and 1, with the marginal worker of abilitŷ µ ≡ µ (θ) establishing the effect of the reassignments.
We now consider comparative statics of the wage function. (The results presented here generalize beyond the two-job model to one with a continuum of jobs, presented below.) Technological progress is represented here by a rise in β 0 and/or β 1 . This results in an unambiguous widening of the income distribution:
is non-decreasing in β 0 and β 1 . 6 This result becomes intuitive once one is clear that β i is the incremental price of ability for a worker on job i, so a rise in β i widens the gap between two workers of different ability.
In gauging the effect of technology on the bottom of the distribution, note that W (0) = (1 − θ)(β 1 − β 0 )μ depends entirely on β's gradient, (β 1 − β 0 ). If productivity rises on the low-skill jobs, W (0) falls, perhaps counterintuitively to a simple notion of biased technical progress. That is, one might think that a rise in β 0 would raise the wages of those with lesser skill, because it does raise their direct contribution to output, β 0 µ. However, for those with the very least skill, this is outweighed by the fact that a rise in β 0 reduces the indirect contribution to output, (1 − θ)(β 1 − β 0 )μ, the productivity gain form promoting workers up the hierarchy. Indeed, in the limit, as β 0 → β 1 , we approach the one-job model, where wages equal ability and W (0) → 0
We now turn to comparative statics with respect to the ability distribution. Note that in this simple two-job model, the role of the ability distribution in the wage function is entirely captured by a single sufficient statistic,μ = F −1 (θ) . Thus, as Figure 1 illustrates, any shift in the ability distribution on fixed support [0, 1] which raisesμ to, say,μ 0 , will raise the earnings of low-ability workers and reduce the earnings of high-ability workers, and conversely for any shift which reducesμ.
For example, a first-order stochastic improvement in the ability distribution raises (or does not reduce) ability at all quantiles, including ability at the critical θ−quantile,μ. Thus, a general improvement in ability not only raises output, but also improves the distribution of income. The reward to low-ability types rises because the promotions which they support are now of higher-ability workers than before, and, for the same reason, the reward to high-ability types falls.
Consider instead a more unequal ability distribution, a mean-preserving spread on fixed support. This improves ability in the right tail and reduces ability in the left tail (with possible multiple crossings in between). Thus, the effect of a more unequal ability distribution depends on whether the worker on the margin between jobs, at quantile θ, lies in the upper or lower tail of the ability distribution. More generally, it is useful to think of the technology as one where the sensitivity to job assignment (gradient of β) is concentrated in jobs filled by low-skill or high-skill workers. If proper job assignment is most critical in the top jobs (i.e. if most jobs are not skill-sensitive -θ is high), then the worker on the margin is in the right tail, so a more unequal ability distribution raisesμ and narrows the wage distribution. Conversely, if assignment matters most toward to the bottom of the spectrum (θ is low) then a more unequal distribution reducesμ and widens the wage distribution. (See Figure 2. ) Finally, let us examine the effect on the income distribution of an increment to the workforce at any arbitrary point of the ability distribution. It is easy to show that this reduces wages of all workers with abilities on the same side ofμ , so they are (Hicks) substitutes and those on the opposite sides ofμ are complements. To see this, note first that the addition of a worker with ability µ 0 will shift down (up) the quantiles of all workers with ability below (above) µ 0 : the CDF, F (µ) , will pivot at µ 0 as depicted in Figure 3 . Thus, the addition of a worker with any ability level µ 0 >μ will raiseμ. As we have seen, this raises earnings of all workers with ability µ <μ and reduces earnings of all workers with ability µ >μ. The converse holds for the addition of a worker with ability µ 0 <μ. As a result, workers of any abilities µ and µ 0 that bracketμ are complements, while those on the same side ofμ are substitutes.
A Continuum of Jobs in a Fixed Production Hierarchy

Wage Profile
In this section and the next, we generalize the model to a continuum of jobs and extend our comparative static results. Let us order jobs, or tasks, within a firm by the sensitivity of output on task to the ability of workers filling it. Denote the rank-order of a task by t ∈ [0, 1]. Define β (t) as the direct contribution to output per unit of ability from a worker placed in task t, where β (t) is non-decreasing. 7 In a fixed production hierarchy, workers within a firm must be assigned to tasks in a fixed distribution (which we normalize to be uniform, without further loss of generality). With this assumption, β (.) completely characterizes the economy's technology.
Obviously, higher ability workers are placed in more ability-sensitive positions; 8 under assumption of fixed proportions, mapping people to tasks oneto-one, we have p = t. That is, output is maximized by assigning a worker of ability µ (p) to the task with β (t = p). Thus in an efficient assignment, a worker's direct contribution to output is
Total output in the hierarchy, Q, is:
What is the distribution of wages for workers in such hierarchies? We use two conditions to derive the wage profile, w(p), the wage as a function of worker's quantile (We distinguish w(p) from W (µ), which gives the wage as a function of ability). First, from the no-arbitrage condition we find the slope of the profile,
which equals the derivative of β(t)µ(p) with respect to p, evaluated at t = p. This follows from observing that no profitable arbitrage opportunity exists if and only if, ∀p,
We assume (though nothing important hinges on this) that the ability distribution is atomless with full support on
is the marginal return to ability for someone of ability level µ(p), dw(p)/dµ(p).
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We can see from (5) and (3) that the wage profile is flatter than the productivity profile of workers' direct contribution to output:
. The higher wage earned by someone slightly up the hierarchy reflects his higher ability, not the higher job placement per se; the gain in output from promoting a worker of ability µ(p) to a higher job, β 0 (p)µ(p), does not accrue to the worker, but rather (as we shall see) to those who make that promotion possible.
The second condition is the zero profit condition,
w(p)dp. This immediately implies that the wage profile crosses the productivity profile from above: those in low job placements earn more than their direct contribution to output, and those in high job placements earn less.
These two conditions (assured, for example, by Bertrand-competitive wagesetting firms) suffice to establish the wage profile, by the following result.
Proposition 1 Let the ability distribution be atomless with full support on [0,1]. Then the fixed hierarchy model of production yields the competitive wage profile:
Integrating by parts,
Using the zero profit condition, we find
Substituting in (8) gives
and the result stated in (6).
Discussion. The wage profile, given in (6) , clearly shows the relationship to the productivity profile, q(p), since that is given by the first term in (6) . The second term, w(p) − q(p) decreases in p: low-wage workers earn more than their direct contribution to output, and high-wage workers earn less, as stated earlier. Further insight on this relationship can be gleaned from the marginal productivity interpretation of (6) .
As in the two-job model, (1)- (2), the second term of (6) ,
µ(z) · dβ(z)dy, is the indirect contribution to (or detraction from) output. It is the effect of reallocating workers up and down the hierarchy in order to restore the one-to-one assignment of workers to tasks, following the introduction of an additional worker of ability µ(p). The dβ(z) term represents the productivity gains/losses from the reassignments, as did the (β 1 − β 0 ) in terms in (1)-(2). The only new bit of analysis here is to understand how the intensity of the reassignments varies up and down the hierarchy, and how this is represented by the double integral.
Consider w(0), the wage of an individual with ability µ = 0. His indirect (indeed, only) contribution to output is the productivity gain form pushing higher ability workers up the hierarchy , given in (9) ,
The addition of a mass of workers at µ = 0 leads to the most intensive rate of reassignment at or near rank zero. Further upward reassignments diminish in intensity, the further up the hierarchy we go, until workers are once again uniformly distributed across tasks. 11 This diminution of the rate of reassignment as we move away from the point of insertion is captured by the double integral, since the greatest weight is accorded to µ(z)dβ(z) for the lowest values of z. In economic terms, this means that wages at the bottom of the distribution depend most heavily on the sensitivity of output to job assignment in the lower-skilled jobs, and less so in the higher-skilled jobs.
Conversely, at the opposite and of the wage profile, we have
Wages at the top of the profile are less than the direct contribution to output because workers must be demoted to lower positions, with reduced output, to accommodate an additional worker at the top. Again, the most intensive reallocation occurs at jobs which are closest to that of the new worker -the top jobs in this case. More generally, for a worker of rank p ∈ (0, 1), (6) shows that the indirect contribution to output consist of the productivity gains and losses from reallocating workers up and down the hierarchy from task t = p, with the intensity of the reallocation diminishing as one moves farther from job p, occupied by the worker in question, toward jobs 0 and 1.
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Note that although workers of high ability earn less than their direct contribution to output, firms cannot gain ex post by bidding these workers away from one another. Any such move would require shifting downward the assignments of less able incumbents. The reduction in output from this would absorb all of the apparent gain from the acquisition. Similarly, although low-ablity workers earn more than their direct contribution to output, firms cannot gain by firing such workers, since this would necessitate (after rescaling the level of the firm's operation) the demotion of others to take up his tasks, with the attendant reduction in their output.
We have thus provided an explanation of why the wages of members of an academic department (say) may be less variable than their productivities in any particular task. If agents work in teams with varied tasks which require the application of person-hours in fixed relative proportions, the total returns to ability cannot be proportional to agents' direct contributions to output. This is so even when, as in our model, more able agents are proportionately better at every conceivable task, because adding such an agent to the team incurs the cost of re-assigning all of the other team members. 12 An alternative way of seeing the reallocation process, directly related to (6) , is to consider a wave of reallocations from job p to the adjacent job, and so on, to job y. The output gain (or loss) from this wave is R y z=p µ(z) · dβ(z). If we insert at job p a mass dp of workers with ability µ(p), then one restores the uniform assignment of workers to jobs with a series of waves, just like the one described, with the endpoints of such waves, y, distributed uniformly on [0,1].
That is precisely what the double integral in (6) describes.
Substitutes and Complements
We now turn to the question of Hicks substitutability or complementarity, the effect of an increase in one type of labor on the wage of another. All the distributional questions mentioned in the introduction-the effect of immigration, etc.
-rest on these relationships. Under a production function with discrete ability types we would examine the cross-partials, F ij (L 1 , ..., L n ). Here, we shall perform the analogous exercise pertinent to a continuous ability distribution, and consider how these relationships depend on the technology, β(·). Specifically, we consider the addition to the labor force L of a mass of labor, 4 p , with ability µ p , and find the effect on the wage of a worker with ability µ p , and find the effect on the wage of a worker with ability µ r . (The notation is chosen to indicate that µ p and µ r are constants that correspond to the ability at quantiles p and r, prior to the addition of 4 p .)
The key to the analysis is the effect that an increment of labor 4 p has on the assignment ability-types to quantiles above and below it. As Figure 3 depicts, the insertion of labor raises the ability levels assigned to lower quantiles and reduces those assigned to higher ones. Specifically, the assignment of ability µ to quantile z, µ(z; 4 p ) is implicitly given by z = F (µ)( L L+4 p ) for µ < µ q , and
The assignment of ability to any quantile z responds to an infinitesimal 4 p as follows:
Since the output is given by
using (11) . The MP interpretation of (6) can then readily be verified (see Appendix):
We now turn to the result we are looking for (see Appendix for proof):
Proposition 2 For quantiles p < r,
By Shepherd's Lemma, this expression also gives us ∂W (µ p )/∂4 r .
Discussion:
The net effect on W (µ r ) of adding workers of ability µ p works entirely through the worker's indirect marginal productivity. First, since the addition of µ p − workers raises the ability of individuals assigned to quantiles z < p < r, the demotions required to accommodate a worker of µ r become more costly, this effect tends to reduce W (µ r ), as the first term in (13) indicates. The second term concerns quantiles between p and r, since the addition of µ p −workers decreases ability over that interval, the demotions in that range to accomodate a worker of µ r become less costly, thereby raising W (µ r ). Finally, tha addition of µ p −workers decreases the abilities assigned to the highest quantiles, too, z > q > p; this reduces the productivity gains from the promotions supported by µ r -workers, reducing W (µ r ), as the third term indicates. Thus, the first and third terms contribute to Hicks substitutability, while the second term to complementarity. Naturally, the more similar two workers are (i.e. the closer p is to r), the more likely they are to be substitutes. In the limiting case, as p → r the second term of (13) vanishes and we simply have diminishing marginal productivity. At the opposite extreme, as p → 0 and r → 1, the first and third terms vanish, and we have complementarity: top-ability workers are helped by increased supply of the least-skilled, and conversely.
Consider more closely the addition of low-ability workers. near µ = 0, e.g. from the low-skilled range of immigrants. What determines how many lowskill workers are hurt vs. high-skill workers who are helped? In this model, the nature of the technology determines the answer. Examining (13) one can show that if β(·) is convex, then more low-skill workers are likely to be hurt than if β(·) were concave. That is, more people of low ability would be hurt by additional workers of lesser ability if the gradient of β(·) -the sensitivity of output to proper job assignment -is concentrated in the high-skill jobs. The reason is that under such a technology, the main effect of new low-skill workers, which reduces ability levels assigned to all quantiles, is the adverse effect on the value of promotions supported by most workers, up through the high-skill jobs. Conversely, if the technology is such that the sensitivity of output to proper job assignment is concentrated in low-skill jobs, then the infusion of very-lowskill workers helps most workers, by reducing the cost of demotions required to accomodate them.
Similarly, we may consider the addition of high-ability types, near µ = 1 , e.g. from the top end of the immigrant spectrum. Again, the concavity or convexity of β(.) affects the gains or losses. More people of low ability would be helped by additional high-ability workers, to the extent that the sensitivity of output to job assignment is concentrated in high-skill jobs, since they would gain from the large rise in the value of the promotions they support. Again, the converse holds for the opposite type of technology.
In Section 6 , we analyze broader changes in the ability distribution, using different methods. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the effects of any change in the ability distribution ultimately rest on a series of point insertions like those we have analyzed here. The result follows directly from (5) :
Since β(·) is the marginal return to ability, a rise in β(·) widens the gap between wages of people of different ability, worsening the income distribution, as in the 2-job model.
The effect of technical progress on wages of the least-skilled, w(0), is also similar to that found in the 2-job model: it depends on what happens to the gradient of β(·) . This can be immediately seen by writing (9) as w(0) =
A parallel shift in β(·) has no effect on w(0), but if technical progress is concentrated in the higher-skilled jobs, then β(·) gets steeper and w(0) rises. Conversely, if technical progress is concentrated in the low-skilled jobs, this flattens β(·) and reduces w(0). As in the 2-job case, this possibly surprising result is easily explained. The rise in β(·) for jobs filled by the least-skilled raises their direct contribution to output, but vanishingly so as µ(p) → 0. Thus, this is outweighed by the fact that a rise in β(.) for the low-t's toward that of the high-t's reduces the productivity gain form shifting workers up the hierarchy, which is the 0-ability worker's sole contribution to output.
The Distributional Effect of Improved Ability
Consider an improvement in the endowment of ability. That is, consider a CDF on the distribution of µ, G(·) which exhibits first-order stochastic dominance over
. Then we can immediately establish the following result:
Proposition 4 A first-order stochastic improvement in the distribution of ability raises w(0) and reduces w(1).
. The result then follows by inspection of (9) and (10) .
The logic is the same as we found in the 2-job model. A rise in the population's ability makes the promotions supported by a zero-ability worker more valuable, and it makes the demotions more costly that are required to accommodate a top-ability worker.
Thus, an improvement in the population's ability distribution has the opposite effect on the wage span from an improvement in technology. As we saw, technical progress raises the price of incremental ability, β(·), widening the wage gap w(1) − w(0) = R 1 z=0 β(z)µ 0 (z)dz . By contrast, a general rise in ability between µ = 0 and 1 reduces µ 0 (·) at high z 0 s and raises it at low z 0 s, thereby redistributing the gradient of ability toward the lower-skilled jobs, where it fetches a lower price. Thus, a general rise in ability reduces the average price over the full span of ability, narrowing the wage span.
The Output and Distributional Effects of Ability Dispersion
We now turn to the paper's main question: under what conditions a more unequal ability distribution map onto a wider or narrower wage distribution?
The question can be motivated by a comparison of economies with identical means but different dispersions of ability, as might be occasioned by more or less stratified processes of human capital development (e.g. educational tracking, according to its critics).
The question also arises when considering the effect of improved information. Suppose employers do not observe a worker's ability, but receive an imperfectly informative signal (e.g. a test or school attendance records). 13 Each worker's expected ability is assessed conditional on the information available about him. Since output is linear in worker abilities, expected output depends only on the distribution of expected abilities. That is, it makes no difference whether the workers assigned to a given job all have the same known ability or have an array of unknown abilities with the same average. Thus, taking the distributions as a whole, there is no difference for risk-neutral firms between facing a population with a given distribution of known abilities and facing a different population with the same distribution of conditional expected abilities (but of course a different, more disperse distribution of underlying unknown abilities). Both cases result in the same expected output and the same wage distribution. 14 Now, better information will lead to a different, more disperse distribution of expected ability in the worker population. We can formally establish a rather general and quite useful result (see Appendix for proof) on the precise sense in which better information leads to a more unequal distribution of expected ability. 15 Theorem 1 Consider two tests of worker abilities, and suppose that test 1 is more informative than test 2 in the sense of Blackwell [1953] . Then the population distribution of estimated mean productivities induced by test 1 (viewed as a random variable ex ante) is riskier ( in the sense of second order stochastic dominance) than that induced by test 2
The significance of the result is this: to do comparative statics of the effect of "improved information" in a model with uncertain worker abilities, it is sufficient 13 We keep matters simple by assuming that workers and employers have the same information, so workers too are uncertain about how well they will perform. We continue to assume that worker abilities are exogenous. Thus, we are neglecting here the important issue of how changing the quality of information available to employers about worker abilities affects the incentives which workers have to acquire skills, as briefly discussed in the Conclusion.
14 Rank workers of unknown ability α by the value of their signal s, scaled in percentiles. Then expected output is E(Q) = R 1 0 β(s)E[α|s]ds. This is isomorphic to the certainty case, Q = R 1 0 β(p)µ(p)dp, for a hypothetical population where the distribution of known ability, µ(p) , is identical to the first population's distribution of expected ability, E [α|s] . 15 This theorem generalizes the well-known case of the normal testing model, where the posterior distribution of expected ability is widened by a reduction in the noise of the test (less regression to the mean). Cornell and Welch [1996] present a related result, but our theorem is somewhat stronger.
to study the effect of a mean-preserving spread of abilities, in a corresponding model where abilities are known. That is, our analysis of the effects of a more unequal (i.e. riskier) ability distribution can be interpreted as applying either to the underlying distribution itself, or to an improvement in information about each worker's place in it. 16 Either way, however, we confine ourselves to the case of fixed support µ ∈ [0, 1] . Under the informational interpretation this means that we shall compare situations in both of which there is sufficient information to assign individuals to the bottom and top of the distribution. This obviously rules out the case of zero information, where the distribution of expected ability is concentrated at the mean, a restriction that should be borne in mind below.
We may now establish an important result: a mean-preserving rise in the riskiness of the ability distribution raises total output, and therefore the mean wage. We can see this intuitively in the simple case of a single crossing of CDFs, where ability rises in the right tail of distribution and drops in the left tail. The rise in ability is for those filling the nearly top jobs, which are the most abilitysensitive. Thus, the output effect here outweighs that from the drop in ability among those filling the ability-insensitive jobs. This result holds more generally, for a mean-preserving spread with possibly multiple crossings (see Appendix for proof):
Proposition 5 Suppose the ability distribution G(·) is "riskier" than F (·), but the two distributions have the same mean. Then Q(G) ≥ Q(F ).
We turn now to our principal question: how does a more unequal distribution of ability, or better information about abilities, affect the equilibrium degree of wage inequality? With regard to better information, it is often assumed that there is a sacrifice in equity that is necessarily incurred for the efficiency gains (Proposition 5) from improving the quality of matches between workers and jobs. The following comparative static analysis should shed some light on the conditions under which this equity-efficiency trade-off holds or whether better information advances both efficiency and equity goals. From a non-informational viewpoint, our result will address the question of whether a more unequal ability distribution necessarily implies more wage inequality.
Let w F (p) denote the wage profile under ability distribution F . From (14), we have
where 4w F denotes the wage rate. We can also write 17 16 Some readers of earlier versions of this paper have commented that improved information only affects earnings early in one's careeer, before one's true abilities are established on the job. The point is well-taken, so the non-informational interpretation may be more compelling for some readers. 
Suppose now that F (·) and G(·) are two distinct distributions of estimated abilities in the worker population. Invoking second-order dominance, we will write "G is more unequal [or riskier] than F " (hereafter G MUT F) if
We may now state the main result for the fixed hierarchy model: Proposition 6 Let F and G be atomless with full support on [0,1]. Let G MUT F:
Proof of Proposition 6:
The results follow immediately from the following lemma.
Lemma 1 G MUT F and ψ(·) convex [concave] imply
Proof. of Lemma 1: Since abilities lie in the unit interval and both F (·) and G(·) are atomless with full support, we conclude that F −1 (0) = G −1 (0) = 0, F −1 (1) = G −1 (1) = 1, and both F −1 (·) and G −1 (·) are continuous and strictly increasing on [0,1]. Taking these inverse functions as CDF's in their own right, we further conclude that G MUT F implies F −1 MUT G −1 (see the proof of Proposition 5). So the inequality of the lemma is the principle characterization result for a second-order stochastic dominance (the expectation of a convex function is no less under a riskier distribution).
To complete the proof of Proposition 6, employ 15-16 to see that:
β(z)dz; and, 17 Proof. Integrating (9) by parts, w F (0) =
Changing the order of integration gives the result in (16) . Substituting into (15) gives the expression for w F (1).
Since β(·) is non-decreasing, β(·) convex implies that ψ 1 (·) and ψ 2 (·) are convex, while β(·) concave implies that ψ 0 (·) is convex and ψ 2 (·) is concave. This proves Proposition 6
Proposition 6 assesses the impact of a more unequal ability distribution ( or a more informative test of worker abilities) on the equilibrium range of wages. If output per unit of ability (β(·)) is convex (concave) function of a worker's position in the hierarchy, then a greater dispersion of ability (on fixed support) lowers wages for the most (least) skilled workers, and compresses (widens) the wage range.
The way that β 0 s curvature conditions the effect of ability dispersion on w(0), w(1), and 4w can be understood by noting first that such dispersion raises the ability of those in the high-skilled jobs and reduces it in the lowerskilled jobs. Recall that w(0) represents the productivity gains form promoting workers up the hierarchy, especially through the lower-skill jobs, since that is where the intensity of the rate of promotions greatest upon the addition of a µ = 0 worker. Thus, by reducing the ability of workers on these jobs, a rise in ability dispersion tends to reduce the productivity gains from these promotions, provided the gradient β 0 (·) in these jobs is at least as high as in the moreskilled jobs. Thus, if β(·) is concave w(0) falls with a rise in ability dispersion; indeed, w(0) falls relative to w(1), so the wage span widens. Conversely, the earnings distribution is compressed by a more unequal ability distribution when β(·) is convex. Here the gradient is steepest among the high-skill jobs, whose occupants are the ones most intensively demoted from the addition of a µ = 1 worker. Since their ability rises with a more unequal distribution, the cost of demoting them rises, so w(1) falls and the wage span narrows. 18 The same logic holds when we consider technologies where β(·) is S-shaped, rather than convex or concave, as in the 2-job model. What matters is the location of the near-vertical region of the S, i.e. the steepest region of β(·). This is the region where the gains or losses from reassigning workers are concentrated, so that is where the distributional effect of a change in the ability distribution will play out. If this region lies in the low-skilled jobs, where a more unequal ability distribution reduces µ, then w(0) will fall and w(1) will rise. Conversely, a more unequal ability distribution will raise w(0) and reduce w(1) if job assignment is most sensitive in the high-skilled jobs. That is why, in our 2-job model, the effect of a more unequal ability distribution depended critically on whether θ, the proportion of low-skill jobs, was low or high.
The Output and Distributional Effects of Economic Integration
The final change we analyze in the distribution of abilities arises from the economic integration of distinct populations. Let there be two populations with distributions of estimated ability denoted by F a (µ) and F b (µ) respectively. Think of these as representing workers in different regions of a country, distinct racial or ethnic groups, or different nations. The underlying ability distributions may differ, or the test of worker abilities may be more informative about one group than the other. Consider what would happen if the two populations were to merge, due to the economic integration of their labor markets, assuming that a common technology, represented by β(·), prevails both before and after integration. How would the level and distribution of per capita output be affected?
Let λ be the fraction of a's in the total population, 0<λ < 1. Then the merged population's ability distribution is given by F λ (µ) ≡ λF a (µ) + (1 − λ)F b (µ). So, if group a's ability distribution first-order stochastically dominates that of group b, the merged group lies in between: This result may help explain why it is the elites within relatively backward populations, along with the lower classes of relatively advanced groups, who sometimes resist labor market integration. Each is the relatively scarce "factor" within its own group; as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests, these are precisely the workers harmed by economic integration. Corollary 1 also show how economic integration tends to narrow wage dispersion, by raising the overall minimum and lowering the overall maximum wages.
Similarly, if we merge groups with the same mean but unequal distributions, we have
Corollary 2 When group a's ability distribution MUT that of group b, economic integration results in:
Thus, whether β(·) is convex or concave, integration always has the effect of moving at least one extreme of the overall wage distribution toward the mean. It is interesting to consider this result as applying to two groups with the same underlying ability distribution but different degrees of observability. Those at one or both extremes of the wage distribution in the less accurately observed group, b, stand to lose from integration with the more accurately observed group.
Whatever its distributional consequences, integration of two such groupsor any two groups -must benefit both groups in the aggregate. (see Appendix for proof):
Proposition 7 Regardless of the technology, or the ability distributions in the two populations, both groups benefit on average from economic integration:
To continue the example above, the average member of a less accurately observed group definitely gains from being integrated with a more accurately observed group, even though individuals from one or both ends of that group's distribution will lose.
Production in Variable Proportion Hierarchies
Crowding, Non-Uniform Assignment, Arbitrage and No-Profit Conditions
We now relax the assumption of strict complementarity in the number (or density) of workers across tasks, i.e. of fixed proportions. We may think of fixed proportions as a technology characterized by extremely deleterious effects of crowding workers into tasks, relative to the number of workers in other tasks. That is, any deviation from the fixed proportions, which reassigns workers from one small range of tasks to another, reduces output in the former, but does not raise output at all in the latter. The obvious relaxation, which we adopt, is to suppose that the effect of crowding is not so extreme as to block any additional output, but rather that raising the proportion of workers assigned to a small range of tasks raises the output from those tasks less than proportionately.
Formally, we relax the assumption of uniform assignment, p = t, by letting a non-uniform CDF Φ(t) denote the proportion of the workforce assigned to task t or lower: p = Φ(t) Let ϕ(t) ≡ Φ 0 (t) be the assignment density of workers to tasks. Let ϕdt natural units of labor on tasks (t, t + dt) generate h(ϕ)dt "effective" units of labor, where h(ϕ) is a smooth neoclassical production function,
Normalize h(1) = 1, such that effective units of labor equal natural units when workers are assigned uniformly across tasks. Note that the elasticity of h, η(ϕ) ≡ ϕh 0 (ϕ)/h(ϕ) < 1, so effective labor rises less than proportionately to the density of natural units, the relaxation of fixed proportions that we were seeking. Output is thus given by:
Note that fixed proportions is a limited case where h(ϕ) → min(ϕ, 1), the Leontief technology (see Figure 4) . In this case, firms will choose the uniform assignment, Φ(t) = t, ϕ(t) = 1 ∀t, since any departure from this means ϕ(t) > 1 over some tasks, which wastes labor. We can then trivially change variables from t to p, giving us (4).
More generally, for non-Leontief h(ϕ), it will be useful to express the output from tasks (t, t + dt) as the output from corresponding workers (p, p + dp).
To implement the change of variables, from t to p, define the assignment of tasks to workers as the inverse of the assignment of workers to task. That is, the proportion of tasks assigned to workers of ability quantile p or lower is t = T (p) ≡ Φ −1 (p). Workers at quantile p are assigned tasks with density
We thus have
This expression is readily interpreted. Since h[1/τ (p)]τ (p) is the effective units of labor per natural unit of labor, the integrand is simply output per natural unit of labor.
We can now immediately generalize Proposition 1. Define
the output per unit of ability for a worker of ability µ(p), for any given assignment function. Then the same arbitrage and zero-profit condition used in (6) give us
That is, by substituting b(·) for β(·) the wage profile (6) generalizes from the fixed uniform assignment to any given assignment function, whether or not it is optimal.
Optimal Assignment
For any given wage schedule, profit-maximizing firms will obviously distribute workers across jobs to maximize output. Formally, the choice of Φ(·) can be posed in the standard calculus of variations format, to maximize
with boundary conditions Φ(0) = 0 and Φ(1) = 1. The Euler equation,
or, equivalently,
The RHS is the marginal benefit of reducing the density of workers at task t 0 , and raising the density at task t 1 , a task with higher marginal productivity; the LHS is the marginal cost of this reallocation of workers from lower to higher tasks, which is to replace the workers in intervening tasks with workers of lower ability, drawn from lower tasks.
Further intuition can be gleaned by carrying out the differentiation and rearranging:
where η ≡ ϕh 0 /h < 1. The LHS, the slope of the optimal assignment density, is the rate at which crowding should rise at higher tasks. The RHS points to three factors. First, the curvature of the effective labor production function, −h 00 , measures the cost of uneven crowding due to diminishing returns, so it is inversely relate to |ϕ 0 | 20 . Second, the benefit of pushing more workers up the hierarchy is the higher return to any given ability, β 0 /β. Third, the cost of pushing more workers up the hierarchy is that it crowds workers of higher ability: the steeper is the ability gradient, µ 0 /µ, the greater the cost of crowding more workers onto higher tasks. The slope of the optimal assignment density reflects these costs and benefits. 20 The extreme case is Leontief [h(ϕ) → min(ϕ, 1)], where h 00 → −∞ around ϕ = 1, so the optimal assignment is uniform [ϕ 0 = 0], as stated earlier. The opposite limiting case is perfect substitutability, h(ϕ) → ϕ, ∀ϕ. Here, h 0 (ϕ) = η(ϕ) = 1, and h 00 (ϕ) = 0, so −h 00 ϕ 0 = 0 < h 0 [
, and (25) fails for any non-degenerate assignment. The reason is that under perfect substitutability crowding has no effect, so all workers are piled onto task t=1, where productivity is highest.
Wage Profile at Optimal Assignment
The no-arbitrage and zero-profit conditions imply wage profile (21) for any given assignment, optimal or not. At the optimal assignment, we offer the following nice result:
Proposition 8 The variable proportions model yields the competitive wage profile:
Proof. The Euler condition (24) can be rewritten with a change of variables:
Integrating R y z=p b(z)dµ(z) by parts and rearranging,
Substituting into (21) gives the desired result.
The interpretation of (26) is straightforward. The output per worker of ability µ(p) , on the task to which he is assigned, is b(p)µ(p). Of that, the share attributable to that worker is simply the elasticity of effective labor η[1/τ (p)]. That is, his marginal contribution to output on that task is β[
]}, is attributable to workers on other tasks, since they reduce the relative crowding on the task in question. Conversely, the second term of (26) is the contribution of worker p to the output on tasks assigned to all other workers, due to complementarity throughout the job structure.
Of course, the marginal productivity interpretation of (6), as generalized in (21), still holds, as well. This interpretation, it will be recalled, is the addition to output from adding a worker of µ(p) to the appropriate task while reassigning other workers to maintain the given assignment proportions. The marginal productivity interpretation of (26), just discussed, considers the addition to output without reassigning other workers. These two assignments yield equal results at the optimum, by the envelope theorem.
Comparative Statics in the Cobb-Douglas Case
Consider the case h(ϕ) = ϕ η , where η, the elasticity of effective labor with respect to natural untis, is constant. This can be considered a Cobb-Douglas production function, with unitary elasticity of substitution between labor on task and a task-specific factor.
Explicit solutions can be found in this case. (See Appendix). From these immediately follow the comparative statics with respect to technology:
Proposition 9 In the Cobb-Douglas case, any change in the productivity function β(·) that raises (reduces) output:(i) raises (reduces) the wage paid at any quantile; and (ii) widens (narrows) the wage gap between any two quantiles.
Let us compare these results with the fixed proportions case. As discussed in Section 4.1, if technical progress is concentrated in the low-skilled jobs, flattening β(·), this reduces w(0) under fixed proportions. But under constant elasticity, Proposition 9 (i) states that technical progress must raise all wages, including w(0). Here there is no such thing as technical progress which is so biased against any skill group that it can reduce its wages. This is similar to the classic result for the Cobb-Douglas production function in non-assignment models.
To understand the difference between Cobb-Douglas and fixed proportions cases, note from 21 that under variable proportions w(0) depends on the gradient of b(·), not just β(·) . In the Cobb-Douglas case, there is enough substitutability that any technical improvement which flattens β(·) is offset by optimizing reassignment which steepens
1−η over at least some quantiles, thereby raising w(0). Proposition 9 (ii) states that the interquantile wage differential, w(p) − w(p 0 ), p > p 0 , must widen with any output-raising change in β(·). This is a bit stronger than the corresponding proposition 3. Under fixed proportions, the wage gap is widened between any two quantiles on either side of any improved tasks, but here the wage gap is widened between all quantiles, even if the improved tasks are located elsewhere in the hierarchy. Again, note that the incremental price of ability is b(p), not β(p). Proposition 9 (ii) implies that in the constant elasticity case, if β(p) rises over any interval, b(p) rises over all intervals, by virtue of the optimizing reassignment. This widens w(p) − w(p 0 )
Comparative statics for the ability distribution (see Appendix) are given by:
Proposition 10 In the Cobb-Douglas case, any change in the distribution of (expected) ability on [0,1] that raises (reduces) output: (i) raises (reduces) w(0); (ii) reduces (raises) w(1); and (iii) narrows (widens) the wage span between any two workers of given abilities, W (µ) − W (µ 0 ). A mean-preserving spread of the ability distribution raises output, so it raises w(0), reduces w(1) and narrows
Proposition 10 shows that the fixed proportions results on first-order stochastic improvements in the ability distribution (Proposition 4) hold for the CobbDouglas case as well. Also, the output-enchancing effect of a mean-preserving spread in the ability distribution is not surprising, since Proposition 5 obtained this result for fixed assignment, so a reoptimizing assignment only reinforces this.
What is different is that Proposition 10 finds that a mean-preserving spread raises w(0) and reduces w(1), narrowing w(1) − w(0) (and all other fixed-ability wage gaps), independent of the shape of β(·), quite unlike the fixed proportions case (Proposition 6) , where the shape of β(·) is critical. Specifically, under concave b(·), with fixed assignment, a mean-preserving spread of abilities reduces w(0) and widens w(1) − w(0), so the reoptimizing assignment reverses these results. The effect of information -and ability inequality more generally -is thus more assuredly egalitarian under Cobb-Douglas crowding technology than under fixed proportions.
CES Crowding Technology
We have found opposite effects on the wage span from a mean-preserving spread in abilities under Cobb-Douglas and Leontief crowding technologies (h=ϕ 
The behavior of the wage span turns entirely on what happens to ϕ(1). In the Cobb-Douglas case, a more unequal ability distribution always raises ϕ(1) and reduces w(1) − w(0). What happens, and why, for less flexible crowding technologies?
A mean-preserving spread raises the ability of those who are near -but not at -the top of the distribution. This raises the cost of crowding these individuals on the tasks to which they are assigned, relative to the costs of crowding individuals in other tasks, both above and below them. How should this crowding be alleviated? Some shift in density down the hierarchy is obviously worth doing, since ability has declined in some of the lower quantiles, thereby diminishing the costs of crowding there. The question at hand is when there should also be some reallocation up the hierarchy, raising ϕ(1).
Consider the CES crowding function, h(ϕ) = [(1 − a) + aϕ −r ] −1/r , r ≥ 1.
21
As r → 0 and r → ∞, we have the Cobb-Douglas and Leontief cases already analyzed. In general, an explicit solution for ϕ(1) and the wage span are not available, but some insights can be obtained, beginning with the special case of constant β (see Appendix):
Proposition 11 Constant β and CES. (i) For any given distribution of µ, there exists r * ∈ (0, 1) such that for r ∈ (−1, r * ), the wage span w(1) − w(0) falls with any mean-preserving spread of µ; (ii) as r→ ∞, the effect of any mean-preserving spread of µ on w(1) − w(0) approaches zero from above Proposition 11 (ii) indicates that if the crowding effects are strong (substitution is limited), then the crowding of those near the top of the hierarchy, whose ability has risen from a mean-preserving spread, is alleviated entirely by a shift down the hierarchy. This reduces ϕ(1) and widens w(1) − w(0). But if the crowding effects are weak (more substitution), then Proposition 11 (i) indicates the optimal response will also include reallocating workers from near the top to the very highest tasks, marginally raising the crowding of those top workers whose ability has not risen by much. This raises ϕ(1) and reduces w(1) − w(0).
This basic result, for constant β, is modified when β(·) slopes up. That is, in addition to the previous analysis of how to minimize the costs of crowding workers of varying abilities, we must now also consider the benefits of putting the higher-ability workers in the more ability-sensitive jobs. Intuitively, this would seem to tilt the optimal reallocation upward after a mean-preserving spread, compared to the constant-β case, in order to exploit the ability rise in the higher fractiles. Thus, the net result on ϕ(1) and the wage span depends not only on the severity of crowding, but now also on the shape of β(·) -its concavity or convexity -as we saw under fixed proportions.
To summarize this line of thinking, we should expect the following: 22 (i) If the cost of crowding is low, then a mean-preserving spread of ability leads to a rise in density at the very top jobs, narrowing the wage span, regardless of the shape of β(·), as we saw in the Cobb-Douglas case. The reason the shape of β(·) does not matter here is that since density shifts upward with the ability spread under constant β, it does so a fortiori when β(·) slopes up (regardless of its curvature) as just discussed. (ii) If the cost of crowding is high, then the shape of β(·) matters. For constant β, a mean-preserving spread of ability lead to a drop in density in the top jobs, widening the wage span; but this need not hold when β(·) slopes up. The condition under which more unequal ability will narrow the wage span depends on how steep β(·) is in higher-skilled tasks, relative to the lower-skilled tasks, i.e. how convex is β(·). If β(·) is very steep over the high-skilled tasks, then it is very costly to reallocate workers down the hierarchy in order to alleviate the crowding on those fractiles where ability has risen; it is better to reallocate at least some of the workers upward, raising density on the top jobs and reducing the wage span.
Conclusion
It is commonplace among labor economists to think of job ladders, where workers move up and down the hierarchy to fill needed slots. 23 Our model draws out the wage implications of this job structure, including the productivity gains/losses from such reassignments that are indirectly attributable to workers elsewhere in the hierarchy.
Our paper has analyzed the implications of such a job assignment model for the comparative static effects of changes in technology and the ability distribution on the distribution of wages. The results have been summarized in the Introduction, and need not be repeated here. We would, however, invoke these results with some caution, given the limits of our assumptions, chief of which is that of exogenous ability. Under perfect observability, the model generalizes nicely and we are able to show that investment in ability is efficient. However, if there is imperfect observability, investment is suboptimal and, more interestingly, may in some cases become even more suboptimal when information becomes less imperfect. If so, we would have a situation where more information has adverse effects on both efficiency and distribution, whereas under exogenous ability information unambiguously enhances efficiency (Proposition 5).
We conclude with some reflections on what insights our analysis might conceivably contribute to the discussion of recent decades' trends in the distribution of income. Some portion of the deteriorating real wage at the bottom of the distribution is ascribed to changes in the ability distribution, including the effects of immigration. Our model is certainly consistent with such findings (Section 3.2), and may offer an additional interpretation of the phenomenon; a bulge of unskilled workers depresses wages in that part of the spectrum by depressing the gains from promoting those immediately above oneself. By the same token, the model certainly suggests that improvements in the bottom of the educational distribution would ameliorate the income distribution, again through the logic of the assignment model. On the other hand, the model indicates that if such improvements were to be made at the expense of maintaining achievement at the highest levels of distribution, then the distributional benefits are by no means assured (Propositions 6 and 10).
Technical change, of course, is widely understood to have driven much of the last two decades' distributional trends. Our model offers some potential insights into the mechanism by which this might have occurred. If productivity gains are concentrated in the least skilled jobs, flattening β(·), this would have an adverse effect on the bottom of the wage distribution. Has computerization, for example, had its greatest impact on clerical output and administrative support functions? Obviously, our model cannot answer these empirical questions, but it can help pose them and interpret the results.
Appendix:
Proof that w(q)=Marginal Productivity of Worker with Ability µ r . From (12) ,
Integrating by parts, we have
Substituting,
Proof of Proposition 2. Let W (µ r; 4 p ) explicitly denote W (µ r ) 0 s dependence on 4 p :
We can immediately establish that
Reversing the order of integration
.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Consider the following version of the standard Bayesian model of statistical inference. Firms have common prior beliefs about ability α ∈ [0, 1] in the population from which they hire, given by a probability distribution Π(dα). Firms observe a common signal s∈ [0, 1] for each worker. The information this signal provides about unobserved ability depends upon the likelihood L(ds|α) which gives a probability distribution of the signal, conditional on ability for every ability level. Firms use Bayes's Rule to formulate posterior beliefs about each worker's productivity.
In terms of statistical decision theory, the likelihood L(·|·) defines an experiment. (Below we use "L" to denote a likelihood function, and the "experiment" or "test" which it characterizes.) A classic paper by Blackwell [1953] defines and usefully characterizes what it means for one experiment to be more informative than another. Intuitively,
if the signals reported from L 2 are a "garbled" version of the signals reported from L 1 -that is, if there exists a family of probability distributions B(ds 2 |s 1 ) such that, ∀α :
in the sense if and only if every expected utility maximizer would prefer to observe the signal s 1 from experiment L 1 , rather than the signal s 2 from experiment L 2 , before taking a decision, the payoff from which depends on the unknown state of the world. Thus, Theorem 1, based on Blackwell's utilitarian definition of "MIT," can be proven using his result on "garbling".
Let s i be an arbitrary outcome from test L i , i = 1, 2; let α be unknown worker ability; letμ = E[α], the a priory mean ability; let µ i (s i ) = E[α|s i ], the conditional mean ability given score s i on test L i ; and finally, letμ i denote the random variable µ i (s i ) [as envisioned before L 1 is given], the population distribution of estimated ability.
Obviously
] for all convex functions, v(·). By Blackwell's Theorem, there exists a "garbling" of L 1 which is a sufficient statistic for L 2 . That is, the distribution of the experimental outcome s 2 in L 2 can be regarded as having been generated by first running L 1 to get some outcome s 1 , and then randomly reporting a possible outcome s 2 , according to some probability law B(ds 2 |s 1 ) , which can be given independently of the true state of nature,α. Now, "invert the garble" as follows: For each s 2 under L 2 , considerB −1 (ds 1 |s 2 ), the distribution ofs 1 , the unknown outcome under L 1 from which s 2 was produced via the garbling. 24 Then, using this conditional probability distribution, we have that: , as was to be shown β(F λ (µ))dx}dµ
Combining these results we have
[β(x) − β(F λ (µ))]dx}dµ ≥ 0, because β(·) is non-decreasing, and thus the integrand [β(x) − β(F λ (µ))] above is negative only if the lower limit of integration, F λ (µ), exceeds the upper limit, F i (µ). Since the choice of group a was arbitrary, we have shown that per capita earnings in both groups is no lower (and, generically, strictly higher) in the presence of economic integration.
Solution 1 (to the Cobb-Douglas Case h(ϕ) = ϕ η ) :
Write the control problem for T (p) : Q = R 1 0 q(p, T, τ )dp, where q(p, T, τ ) ≡ β(T )µ(p)h(1/τ )τ . The Euler equation, ∂q/∂T = d dp (∂q/∂T ), can be used to show d dp ln[µ(p))] = · η 1 − η¸d dp ln[β(T (p))] + η d dp ln[µ(p)] + · η 1 − η¸d dp ln[η(1/τ (p))]
In the constant -η case,the last term drops out,and we integrate to find τ (p)dp = 1. For r ∈ (−1, 0], (iii) holds for all p ∈ [0, 1] (the bracketed term is non-negative, since k ≥ (1 − η(1)) and η(p) ≤ 1. For r ∈ (0, ∞), (iii) holds for all p ∈ [p min , 1] and τ (p) = 0 for p ∈ [0, p min ], where k · µ(p min ) r/1+r = 1 − η(1). Note that t = T (p) = 0 for p ∈ [0, p min ], so Φ(0) = p min . That is, the cost of crowding is sufficiently pronounced here that a mass of workers is dumped on task 0, rather than crowd higher-ability workers on their tasks.
Proof of Proposition 11: . From (iii), consider τ as a function of µ and τ (1) . Note that τ is increasing in τ (1), ∀r, and so is R 1 0 τ · dp. Thus, if a mean-preserving spread of µ raises (lowers) R 1 0 τ · dp, τ (1) must fall (rise) to restore R 1 0 τ · dp = 1, and w(1) − w(0) must fall (rise). For r ∈ (−1, 0], it can be readily verified that τ is convex in µ. Therefore R 1 0 τ · dp is the expected value of a convex function of µ, so it rises with a mean preserving spread in µ, and w(1) − w(0) must fall. For r > 0, τ is convex in µ on [0,1] iff it is convex as µ → 1. This is true as r → 0, but not as r → 1. Hence for any given distribution of µ ( and therefore any given k) ∃r * ∈ (0, 1) such that τ is convex in µ for r ≤ r * and Proposition 11(i) follows. For r ≥ 1, τ has a convex kink at µ(p min ), but is concave for µ > µ(p min ). As r → ∞, p min → 0. That is, τ (µ (p)) converges on unity from a concave function which emanates from a point approaching the origin, so any mean-preserving spread of µ reduces R 1 0 τ · dp (infinitesimally) and widens w(1) − w(0).
